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Abstract—The loosely-coupled and dynamic nature of web
services architectures has many benefits, but also leads to an
increased vulnerability to denial of service attacks. While many
papers have surveyed and described these vulnerabilities, they
are often theoretical and lack experimental data to validate
them, and assume an obsolete state of web services technologies.
This paper describes experiments involving several denial of
service vulnerabilities in well-known web services platforms,
including Java Metro, Apache Axis, and Microsoft .NET. The
results both confirm and deny the presence of some of the
most well-known vulnerabilities in web services technologies.
Specifically, major web services platforms appear to cope well
with attacks that target memory exhaustion. However, attacks
targeting CPU-time exhaustion are still effective, regardless of
the victim’s platform.
Keywords-web services; service oriented architecture; denial
of service; XML parser; XML vulnerabilities; web services
vulnerabilities; memory utilization; CPU utilization
I. INTRODUCTION
The loosely-coupled and dynamic nature of web services
(WS) applications facilitates enterprise integration, pro-
vides flexibility, and allows applications to be dynamically
composed from separate services. However, these benefits
also introduce additional complexities. Web services mostly
use extensible markup language (XML)-based messaging,
which requires substantial resources to process [1]. To
support the loosely-coupled and dynamic late-binding of
WS-applications, a WS-provider must expose its services’
metadata to unauthenticated users. The users must also
trust that the metadata provided by the web service does
not contain a malicious payload. As will be detailed in
this paper, these factors could theoretically be exploited by
attackers to cause a denial of service (DoS).
The consequences of DoS attacks can potentially be seri-
ous and widespread. DoS attacks have been reported to cause
disruptions to major services, such as train operations1. As
more services are exposed through WS interfaces (such as
eBay, Google, Amazon, FedEx [2] and government agen-
cies2), the ability to precisely understand these attacks and
their effects on WS-applications is becoming increasingly
important. Despite this urgency, there are few mitigation
tools and technologies available to protect web services from
1http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/23.35.html\#subj10.1
2https://www.govdex.gov.au/giem/index.do
DoS attacks and it still remains a research challenge [3,
Table 2-2, Section 2.6, pp. 2-17] [4]. To make things worse,
existing security technologies designed to provide confiden-
tiality, integrity, and authentication (such as the web services
security standard [5]) introduce further DoS vulnerabilities.
While the DoS problem is not new, its connection with
web services technologies, and especially service oriented
architectures, is not well understood, even though the im-
portance of addressing this problem has often been raised in
the literature [4], [6]–[11].
The rest of this section surveys the most relevant recent
works, and is followed by a summary of the main contribu-
tion of this paper.
A. Related Work
Several papers have been published that survey DoS
vulnerabilities in WS technologies [6]–[8]. Other types of
DoS vulnerabilities may also be gleaned from the various
standards documents [12]–[14].
In the work by Jensen et al. [10], several types of denial of
service attacks, including the XML coercive parsing attack
(here referred to as deeply-nested XML attack – see Sec-
tion III) and the heavy cryptographic processing attack, are
explained. The impact of these attacks on network services
(including web services) is also explained. Similarly, in the
work by Padmanabhuni [8] and Jensen et al. [7], more
attacks on web services are detailed.
However, the vulnerabilities published in these papers are
often theoretical and lack the concrete experimental data
that could verify whether denial of service vulnerabilities
are still valid in the light of recent advances in web services
platforms. The impact of these vulnerabilities is assessed
only theoretically (such as through the ‘impact assessment
model’ [10]) with very little data provided to show exactly
what effect these attacks have on the CPU and memory
consumption of the victim. They also assume that WS-
providers use obsolete technologies which are now rarely
used.
As a result, we do not know precisely how recent web
services platforms may react to DoS attacks, and such
an understanding is essential to the design of effective
mitigation strategies
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B. Contribution
The main contribution of this paper is an analysis of
the effects (such as the CPU and memory utilization) of
exploiting four known web services DoS vulnerabilities
against recent web services platforms. Our results show that,
with few exceptions, recent web services platforms appear to
cope well with attacks that target memory exhaustion, while
attacks targeting CPU-time exhaustion are still effective.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows:
Section II provides a brief overview of WS technologies,
the concept of denial of service, and the nature of DoS
vulnerabilities in web services. Section III describes several
DoS vulnerabilities in WS applications. Section IV details
the results of experiments that exploit these vulnerabilities.
Finally, conclusions and areas for further work are identified
in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND
This section outlines the main web services technologies,
introduces concepts relating to denial of service, and de-
scribes the nature of DoS vulnerabilities in WS applications.
A. Web Services
Web services use Internet standardised technologies such
as XML, HTTP, and TCP to implement platform inde-
pendent and interoperable distributed computing services.
A WS-consumer constructs a request in XML, containing
information about the remote operation to be called and the
required parameters. The WS-provider processes the request
and returns the response. The request and response formats
are described in the web services description language
(WSDL) service metadata. This metadata is important be-
cause it facilitates successful service consumption and de-
livery for clients and servers that may not have interacted
before.
WS applications execute as a series of method calls and
responses. These calls and responses are encoded as XML
messages adhering to the simple object access protocol
(SOAP) specification [15], [16]3. These SOAP messages can
be transported using various communication protocols, the
most common of which is the hypertext transfer protocol
(HTTP).
A WS message may pass through several intermediaries
in its lifetime. Message-layer security protection protects the
message not only on its path from the original sender to
its destination (like SSL), but also when at rest. The main
technology for message layer security is the web services
security (WSS) standard [5]. This specifies mechanisms that
provide basic WS message security including identification
and authentication (through the use of security tokens),
message integrity, and message confidentiality (through the
3Earlier versions of the SOAP specification indicate that SOAP was
an acronym for simple object access protocol, but recent versions of the
standard no longer use the term SOAP as an acronym.
use of XML digital signature and encryption standards [17],
[18]). It also standardises key establishment and key trans-
port mechanisms in SOAP messages.
B. Denial of Service
DoS has many definitions and dimensions. One of the
clearest definitions for denial of service is provided by the
International Telecommunications Union’s (ITU-T) Recom-
mendation X.800 [19], which defines DoS as “the prevention
of authorised access to resources or the delaying of time-
critical operations.”
Denial or degradation of service may result from mali-
cious or benign actions. These actions may originate locally
or remotely from the service or user who is experiencing
denial or degradation of service. Targets for a DoS attack
include the communications bandwidth, memory buffers,
computational resources, the network protocol or application
processing logic of the victim, or any systems on which the
victim depends for delivering service e.g. the domain name
system (DNS) or credit card payment service.
DoS presents significant challenges to the continued use
of the Internet for critical communications. Unlike the
monitoring of confidentiality and integrity, which are both
supported by a wide range of formal tools, models and
techniques, approaches and tools for measuring availability
(in the presence of a malicious and intelligent adversary) are
still embryonic.
An attacker mounting a resource exhaustion style attack
can deny service directly on a victim system, or on a system
on which the victim depends, using either a brute force
attack or a semantic attack. A brute force attack floods the
victim with spurious network packets. Brute force attacks
require the attacker to have access to sufficient resources,
e.g. network bandwidth, to overwhelm the victim, or the
systems on which the victim depends. In contrast, semantic
attacks target the logic or resource allocation strategies of
the victim. This requires detailed knowledge of the protocol,
operating system, or application being targeted.
C. DoS in Web Services
There are several factors that make WS applications
vulnerable to DoS attacks. Firstly, as WS messages are
expressed using the XML technology, which itself contains
DoS vulnerabilities (as described in Section III), these
extend to WS applications.
Secondly, the loosely-coupled nature of WS applications
means that clients need access to application metadata
in order to invoke services. But, if a server responds to
unauthenticated requests, attackers can flood a server with
numerous requests for services with the intention of exhaust-
ing its resources.
Thirdly, although the second vulnerability can be miti-
gated by authenticating access [20], [21], authenticating each
request is not practical in a WS environment. Additionally,
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the authentication of each and every request can itself be
exploited by attackers due to the heavy processing required
by some authentication systems, especially those based on
public-key cryptography.
III. SOME DOS VULNERABILITIES IN WEB SERVICES
This section describes the four DoS vulnerabilities in web
services that have been simulated on our testbed.
A. Deeply-Nested XML
This type of attack exploits the SOAP format, which
allows the embedding of excessively nested XML in the
message body. The SOAP message is then sent to a WS-
provider. The goal is to force the XML parser within the
service to exhaust the memory resources of the host system
by processing numerous deeply-nested documents, and so
cause a denial of service.
B. WSDL Flooding
In spite of its crucial role in web services, the design of
WSDL is unnecessarily complicated, with little emphasis in
the standards on the need to secure the exchange of WSDL
documents [22], [23]. Because WSDL specifications are in
most cases publicly accessible, access is often unauthenti-
cated. As a result, a brute force DoS attack could be initiated
by sending a large number of WSDL requests.
C. Heavy Cryptographic Processing
The WSS standard [5] defines methods to provide confi-
dentiality, integrity, and authenticity to WS messages. Nev-
ertheless, the flexible and expandable nature of the design
introduces DoS vulnerabilities that would allow a semantic-
based attack to be launched. Also, attackers would not have
to intercept a live session to launch this type of attack.
A SOAP message utilising WSS techniques encapsulates
the attack within a SOAP header block represented by a
<wsse:Security> element. The WSS specification states
that multiple <wsse:Security> header blocks are permitted
within a single SOAP header, but they must be targeted
at a unique actor or role. This is intended to prevent a
recipient from having to process multiple <wsse:Security>
SOAP headers. However, the specification also allows for
multiple signature blocks to be included within a SOAP
header. Therefore, an attacker could craft a SOAP message
containing only one <wsse:Security> header block, but
with a large number of <ds:Signature> elements. An entity
who does not anticipate such a message, upon reading the
‘mustUnderstand’ attribute, would have to process every
<ds:Signature> element, resulting in CPU exhaustion, since
the signature verification process involves heavy public-
key cryptographic processing. A similar attack also targets
message encryption.
D. Malformed External Schema Referencing
The syntax of an XML schema specification allows a
document to reference an externally defined XML names-
pace. An XML parser may then attempt to contact the
referenced location to obtain the schema. This attribute of
XML processing can result in various types of DoS. One
type of attack references a malformed schema. In another
type of attack a malicious provider may point to a bogus
schema location that instead causes the parser to retrieve a
large or malicious payload.
The following section describes experiments that measure
the impact of these attacks on a variety of web services
applications.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
This section describes the general approach to running the
experiments, the test environment, the tools for collecting
performance data, the deployment of services containing the
vulnerabilities, the tools used to carry out the attacks, and
the experimental results
A. Approach
One of the key features of a distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attack is that it usually consists of a large number
of attackers, each requesting a service from the victim. As
it processes the flood of requests, the service will inevitably
use up more resources. However, as this observation is true
of all web services, it does not mean that a particular web
service is vulnerable to DoS attack.
To verify if each of the scenarios described in Section III
really are valid points of DoS vulnerability, the baseline
server behaviour when not under attack must first be studied.
The term ‘baseline behaviour’ is used to indicate the level
of resources being consumed by the server when it receives
a large number of legitimate requests. Using this as a
control, the attackers can then be instructed to send the
same number of requests, but this time with a malicious
payload. If the use of resources by a particular web service
increases significantly when under attack as compared to its
baseline behaviour, this implies that the attack exposes a
DoS vulnerability.
B. Testbed and Data Collection
The testbed on which the experiments were carried out
is shown schematically in Figure 1. The testbed contains
a modest number of physical machines: four desktop PCs
with 3GHz dual processors, 4GB of RAM, and Ubuntu
9.10 Linux. These were the only machines actually used
in the experiments, but four other PCs (single core 3GHz
processors and 2GB of memory) are also available for future
experiments.
It is of course difficult to obtain measurements from a
computer that is under DoS attack. The network interface
card may be saturated with traffic and the available CPU
177
Figure 1. Experimental DoS Testbed
and memory resources may be very limited. In addition,
attempts to gather data on the target machine may interfere
with the attack itself and render the results invalid.
To circumvent these problems each potential target com-
puter has two interface cards: one connected to the ‘attack’
network and the other to the ‘monitoring’ network, which are
connected via separate switches. This approach is similar to
that followed on the Deter testbed, which also uses multiple
interface cards [24]. Since the monitoring network carries
no attack traffic, only monitoring requests, it is available for
measuring the performance of the target machine.
The monitoring technology used was the simple network
management protocol (SNMP). This is a protocol mostly
used by system administrators to monitor the performance of
large numbers of machines. An SNMP service is installed on
each computer to be monitored, and can be remotely queried
via an SNMP capable application or via the command line.
The SNMP parameters that can be monitored are numer-
ous, but are mostly limited to system-wide performance
values. What is required for a DoS experiment is more
precise information such as CPU-utilisation and memory
consumption of a specific service. This was enabled by
extending the standard SNMP service via a custom manage-
ment information base (MIB). This enables the monitoring
of CPU and memory consumption of any service (and other
parameters such as thread usage and throughput) using just
a few milliseconds of CPU time for each query. Since the
frequency of queries was 1 second, interference with the
experiment was minimised. To ensure responsiveness when
under heavy attack the SNMP daemon is also assigned a
high priority.
In the experiments described here a script was run on the
monitoring machine to gather SNMP data from the target
machine, which was then saved locally to a file, from which
the graphs were produced.
C. Attacks and Results
The baseline and attack scenarios for each vulnerability
listed in Section III are now described.
1) Deeply-nested XML: A deeply-nested XML attack was
launched against a set of simple WS applications built on
various frameworks, including Java Metro, Apache Axis,
the Microsoft .NET Windows Communication Foundation
(WCF), and Ruby. In the baseline scenario, requests con-
taining a valid SOAP message, as described by the server’s
WSDL, were sent. In the attack scenario, the same number
of requests were sent, but with a malicious payload con-
taining an XML document nested to a depth of 100,000. In
both scenarios, attacks were launched using a script which
generates SOAP requests using the wget utility. A sample is
shown in Figure 2.
#!/bin/bash
counter=0
k=0
while [ $counter -lt $1 ]; do
let i=0
while [ $i -lt 50 ]; do
wget --no-proxy -q --header=’Accept: text/xml’
image/gif, image/jpeg, *; q=.2, */*; q=.2’
--header=’Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8’
--header=’SOAPAction: "add"’
--header=’User-Agent: JAX-WS RI 2.1.2-hudson-182-RC1’
--header=’Host: 192.168.100.51’
--post-file=$2
http://192.168.100.51:8080/someApps &
let i=i+1
let k=k+1
done
sleep 1s
let counter=counter+1
done
echo $k
Figure 2. An example attack script.
The experiments are summarised in Table I, showing:
1) the type of experiment being performed (baseline
experiment and attack experiment),
2) the framework being tested,
3) the attack launch-time (actual runtime of the attack
script, which may be less than the actual duration of
the attack), and
4) the length of observation (that is, the duration of the
system performance data collected from the time the
attack starts).
Results: These experiments show that for most frame-
works (Metro, Axis, and WCF), contrary to popular belief, a
deeply-nested XML attack does not severely impact memory
consumption. However, it does consume significant CPU
resources. Figures 3 and 4 show the CPU and memory
utilisation of the Metro, Axis, and Ruby WS applications
under a normal non-malicious load and under a deeply-
nested XML attack. Note that the CPU utilisation value
shown is the total utilisation over 2 CPUs.
There is a clear increase in the amount of CPU utilisation
for those services running on the Java Metro and Apache
Axis frameworks when under attack (close to the 100%
mark). A similar trend is also observed for the .NET
application, although these results are not shown.
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Table I
DEEPLY-NESTED XML EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS
Type Framework No. of. reqs Attack Launch-time Observ.
Base Metro 3 Attackers@5500 reqs each ≈2m20s each 10 mins
Axis 3 Attackers@5500 reqs each ≈2m5s each
WCF 3 Attackers@5500 reqs each ≈2m10s each 3m20s
Ruby 1 Attacker@500 reqs ≈4min 10 mins
Attack: Metro 3 Attackers@5500 reqs each ≈2m30s each 10 mins
100K-deep Axis 3 Attackers@5500 reqs each ≈2m30s each
nesting WCF 3 Attackers@5500 reqs each ≈2m1s each 3m20s
Ruby 1 Attacker@500 reqs >10 mins 10 mins
Figure 3. Deep XML Attack – CPU Usage
Figure 4. Deep XML Attack – Memory Usage
For the Ruby web service, SOAP4R, CPU utilisation is
also very high, around 50% of the total available, on a 2-
CPU machine. This amounts to a 100% utilisation for the
simple single-threaded Ruby application.
The memory utilisation of the Metro, Axis, and .NET
frameworks does not appear to be significantly affected by
the attack (see Figure 4). This may be because of recent
developments in lazy XML parsers, which only load element
data as required [25].
However, for the Ruby framework, such an attack does
indeed cause severe memory exhaustion. In fact in the
experiments this attack eventually caused the Ruby server
to crash.
2) WSDL Flooding: The WSDL flooding experiment was
carried out against the same web services applications used
for the deeply-nested XML attack. In the baseline scenario,
the payload is a simple HTTP GET request for a static
HTML page, e.g http://localhost:8080/index.html. For the
attack scenario, the payload is also a simple HTTP get
request, but this time for dynamically-generated WSDL, e.g.
http://localhost:8080/axis2/services/EchoService?wsdl. The
attacks were launched using a script, similar to the one
shown in Figure 2. The details of the experiment are shown
in Table II.
Results: As can be seen from Figure 5, this attack,
which simply requests dynamically-generated WSDL, does
cause the servers to use significantly more CPU time. This
is true for all of the frameworks tested, including the Metro,
Axis, and WCF frameworks.
This becomes an issue in a WS application because
WSDL is generally a public document, and restricting access
may not be a simple matter. While it is true that in most
frameworks there is a method of configuring the server to
return static WSDL, the ‘?wsdl’ syntax is the ‘de facto’
method for causing the server to dynamically generate a
WSDL document in many development frameworks.
However, as can be seen from Figure 6, this attack does
not cause any significant increase in the memory usage,
regardless of the framework being attacked. Similar results
have been obtained for the .NET platform, although the
results are not shown here.
3) Heavy Cryptographic Processing: In this scenario the
server to be attacked is a simple echo WS application,
similar to the one used in the previous two attacks. However,
in this case the server was configured to require the use of
WS-Security. In most cases, a WS request must be signed
using at least the X.509 mutual authentication mechanism.
Encryption is also used in some framework implementations.
This attack has been tested against the Metro, Axis, and
WCF frameworks.
To measure the base performance of the server, the pay-
load was a valid SOAP request containing the necessary WS-
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Table II
WSDL FLOODING – EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS
Type Framework No. of. reqs Attack Launch-time Observ.
Base Metro 3 Attackers@37500 reqs each ≈1m43s each 10 mins
Axis 3 Attackers@37500 reqs each ≈1m58s each
WCF 3 Attackers@37500 reqs each ≈1m55s each 3m20s
Attack Metro 3 Attackers@37500 reqs each ≈4m27s each 10 mins
Axis 3 Attackers@37500 reqs each ≈4m20s each
WCF 3 Attackers@37500 reqs each ≈1m56s each 3m20s
Figure 5. WSDL Flood Attack – CPU Usage
Figure 6. WSDL Flood Attack – Memory Usage
Security header. The attack payload consisted of multiple
XML signatures or XML encryption directives within a
single WS-Security header, with the goal of forcing the
service to perform multiple CPU-intensive cryptographic
operations. The details of the experiment are shown in
Table III.
Results: As can be seen from Figure 7, the response
of the various frameworks to this attack varies. In all
frameworks the attack caused the overall CPU utilisation
to increase. The main difference is that for both the Metro
and WCF frameworks, the attack causes an increased CPU
Figure 7. Heavy Cryptographic Attack – CPU Usage
utilisation at the beginning of the attack, which is sustained
over a longer period of time, in comparison to the baseline
scenario. On the Axis framework, the attack still causes a
high CPU utilisation (around 75% and increasing), however,
it is initially of slightly lower intensity. After the first 3
minutes, in the baseline scenario, the CPU utilisation drops
significantly to almost zero, while in the attack scenario, the
high CPU utilisation is sustained for much longer.
There are several possible explanations for the initial high
CPU utilisation in the Axis baseline scenario: (1) Axis may
consume more CPU resources in processing and parsing
new WS requests as opposed to verifying XML signatures,
and (2) the signatures may be handled asynchronously,
having the effect of spreading the CPU load out over a
longer period. The precise reason for this difference between
the behaviour of Metro/.NET and Axis, however, requires
further investigation.
In contrast, this attack does not have any significant effects
on the memory consumption on both the Java Metro and
the Apache Axis platforms. As shown in Figure 8, while the
attack does increase the memory consumption, the increment
is insignificant: in both platforms, the memory consumption
goes up to around 30% and then stays flat around that value.
4) Malformed External Schema: In this scenario the
WS-provider is the malicious entity that serves an XML
document containing the location of a schema, which then
imports several others, one of which is a very large schema
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Table III
HEAVY CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROCESSING – EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS
Type Framework No. of. reqs Attack Launch-time Observ.
Base Metro 3 Attackers@5500 reqs each ≈2m0s each 10 mins
Axis 3 Attackers@5500 reqs each ≈2m7s each
WCF 3 Attackers@5500 reqs each ≈2m10s each 3m20s
Attack: Metro 3 Attackers@5500 reqs each ≈2m3s each 10 mins
50 security Axis 3 Attackers@5500 reqs each ≈2m0s each
headers WCF 3 Attackers@5500 reqs each ≈2m22s each 3m20s
Figure 8. Heavy Cryptographic Attack – Memory Usage
crafted by the provider.
A client was developed using the Microsoft .NET WCF
framework and the built-in DiscoveryClientProtocol library,
which can be used to retrieve WS metadata. The purpose
of this is to allow clients to dynamically discover a service
and access it at runtime. While to date this attack has only
been implemented using the .NET framework, preliminary
analysis suggests that equivalent behaviour can also be
achieved using the Java Metro and Apache Axis frameworks.
Note that this type of attack can also occur when a
dynamic client is being developed, such as when the client
is generating stub classes based on a WSDL, as provided
for in the .NET framework. However, the effect of such an
attack on an off-line client may not be significant.
Results: The experiment shows that the .NET Discov-
eryClientProtocol library will attempt to retrieve all of the
schemas being referenced from the original schema and it
eventually downloads the very large schema. It also attempts
to parse it, resulting in a very high memory consumption
on the client side (see Figure 9). The end result is usually
a memory exhaustion error, causing the client program to
quit.
This vulnerability seems to stem from the insecure logic
of the DiscoveryClientProtocol class of the .NET framework,
which does not check if the referenced XML schema is too
large.
Figure 9. Scenario 4 – total available memory in MB
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has described four major DoS vulnerabilities
in WS applications. It also describes the results of practical
experiments aiming to determine the impact of attacks
against such applications when deployed using each of the
mainstream development frameworks. The main conclusion
to be drawn from these experiments is that, while the vul-
nerabilities do have a significant impact on a service’s per-
formance, it is mainly the CPU-resources that are affected.
By contrast, the high memory consumption often associated
with XML processing only rarely occurs. Future work will
involve using the insights gained from these experiments to
design and implement DoS mitigation techniques to detect
and prevent such DoS attacks.
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